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ABSTRACT 
In Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia and American legal 
lexicographer Bryan A. Garner challenge Americans to start over 
in dealing with statutes in the Age of Statutes. They propose 
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“textualism,” i.e., “that the words of a governing text are of 
paramount concern, and what they convey in their context is what 
the text means.” Textualism is meant to remedy the American lack 
of “a generally agreed-on approach to the interpretation of legal 
texts.” That deficiency makes American law unpredictable, 
unequal, undemocratic and political. In the book’s Foreword, Chief 
Judge Frank Easterbrook calls the book “a great event in American 
legal culture.” It is a remarkable book because it challenges 
common law traditions. This review essay shows how Scalia and 
Garner challenge common law and summarizes the content of their 
challenge. 
This article contrasts the methods of Reading Law with the 
methods of the Continental civil law. It shows that textualism is 
consistent with modern civil law methods. It also shows, however, 
that pure textualism, which largely restricts interpretation to 
grammatical and historical interpretation and excludes non-textual 
interpretation such as equitable, pragmatic and purposive 
approaches, is not consistent with modern civil law methods. In 
modern civil law, textualism and non-textualism coexist. They 
must, if law is to honor legal certainty, justice and policy. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts,1 U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia and American legal 
lexicographer Bryan A. Garner challenge Americans to start over 
in dealing with statutes in the Age of Statutes.2 They propose 
“textualism,” i.e., “that the words of a governing text are of 
paramount concern, and what they convey in their context is what 
 1.  ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (West 2012). [Hereinafter SCALIA & 
GARNER, READING LAW.] 
 2.  See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 
(Harvard Univ. Press 1982); JAMES WILLARD HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES 
(Columbia Univ. Press 1982). 
 
 
                                                                                                             
2013] SCALIA & GARNER’S READING LAW 3 
 
the text means.”3 Textualism is meant to remedy America’s lack of 
“a generally agreed-on approach to the interpretation of legal 
texts.”4 That deficiency makes American law unpredictable, 
unequal, undemocratic and political. 
Reading Law is a how-to handbook for judges who want to 
apply textualism in their daily work. It is not an academic 
monograph that argues the merits of textualism and the demerits of 
non-textualism. Scalia and Garner advise, “Our approach is 
unapologetically normative, prescribing what, in our view, courts 
ought to do with operative language.”5 Reading Law consists of a 
six-page foreword, a four-page preface, a forty-six page 
introduction, seventy short chapters of two-to-ten pages each, a 
four-page afterword, a ten-page appendix on the use of 
dictionaries, a seventeen-page glossary of legal interpretation and a 
sixty-four page bibliography of cases, books and articles. The 
seventy short chapters address fifty-seven “Sound Principles of 
Interpretation” (broken down into five “fundamental principles” 
and fifty-two canons classified in various types) and a section of 
“Thirteen Falsities Exposed.”  
In the book’s Foreword, Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook calls 
the book “a great event in American legal culture. . . . [N]ot since 
Justice Story has a sitting Justice of the Supreme Court written 
about interpretation as comprehensively . . . .”6 In the 1830s Story 
described an approach to interpretation of legal texts much like that 
which Scalia and Garner and propose today.7 Story went further, 
however, and addressed codification of law.8  
 3.  SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at 441. 
 4.  Id. at xxvii. 
 5.  Id. at 9. 
 6.  Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword to SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, 
supra note 1, at xxvi. 
 7.  Where Scalia and Garner provide fifty-seven “Sound Principles of 
Interpretation,” Story offered his own non-exhaustive list of twenty-one 
“fundamental maxims” for the interpretation of statutes. Appendix III (Law, 
Legislation, Codes), in 7 ENCYCLOPÆDIA AMERICANA. A POPULAR DICTIONARY 
OF ARTS, SCIENCE, LITERATURE, HISTORY, POLITICS AND BIOGRAPHY, BROUGHT 
DOWN TO THE PRESENT TIME; INCLUDING A COPIOUS COLLECTION OF ORIGINAL 
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The affinity of Scalia and Garner’s work to Story’s is not 
coincidental. The problem that Scalia and Garner address today 
grows out of the failure of American law to adequately resolve the 
codification controversy of more than a century ago. The 
controversy arose out of the need of the nation for rational law to 
support the ever increasing volume of commerce. It pitted 
proponents of codes, on the one hand, who wanted systematic, 
rational statements of rules along the lines of the French codes of 
ARTICLES IN AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY; ON THE BASIS OF THE SEVENTH EDITION OF 
THE GERMAN CONVERSATIONS-LEXICON 576, 585 (Francis Lieber ed., Carey 
and Lea 1831) [hereinafter ENCYCLOPÆDIA AMERICANA]. His work on the 
principles of constitutional interpretation is better known. See 1 JOSEPH STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 344-442 
(Hilliard, Grey and Co. 1833); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 123-162 (abridged ed., Hilliard, Grey 
and Co. 1833). 
It is remarkable that Scalia and Garner did not note this work in their otherwise 
exhaustive bibliography and that Easterbrook does not seem to be aware of it. 
Story’s authorship was known in his lifetime, and the article has been reprinted 
three times in modern works separately from the ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA. 
See JAMES MCCLELLAN, JOSEPH STORY AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 
350-372 (1971; 2d ed. with an Introduction by Stephen Presser, 1990); JOSEPH 
STORY AND THE ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA. WITH AN ORIGINAL 
INTRODUCTION BY MORRIS L. COHEN (Valerie L. Horowitz ed., Lawbook 
Exchange, Ltd. 2006). The later volume reprints the seventeen other articles by 
Story in the ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA.  
 8.  As Chairman of the Codification Commission in Massachusetts, 
compiler of federal laws, author of the leading treatise on constitutional law, 
professor at Harvard Law School, and Supreme Court justice, he was a major 
participant in the codification controversy that occupied much of American legal 
discourse in the nineteenth century. See JOSEPH STORY ET AL., REPORT OF THE 
COMMISSIONERS APPOINTED TO CONSIDER AND REPORT UPON THE 
PRACTICABILITY AND EXPEDIENCY OF REDUCING TO A WRITTEN AND SYSTEMATIC 
CODE THE COMMON LAW OF MASSACHUSETTS, OR ANY PART THEREOF (Dutton & 
Wentworth 1837), available at http://www.archive.org/details/Reportofcommissi 
1837mass (last visited 4/19/13); THE PUBLIC AND GENERAL STATUTES PASSED 
BY THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FROM 1789 TO 1827 
INCLUSIVE. PUBLISHED UNDER THE INSPECTION OF JOSEPH STORY (Wells & Lilly 
1827), available at http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/001625604 (last visited 
4/19/13); JOSEPH STORY, A DISCOURSE PRONOUNCED UPON THE INAUGURATION 
OF THE AUTHOR, AS DANE PROFESSOR OF LAW IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY 
(Willard, Gray, Little & Wilkins 1829), available at http://www.archive.org/ 
details/discoursepronoun08stor (last visited 4/19/13); CHARLES SUMNER, THE 
SCHOLAR, THE JURIST, THE ARTIST, THE PHILANTHROPIST (William D. Ticknor 
& Co. 1846), available at http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/011212036 (last 
visited 4/19/13). 
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1804, applied justly and predictably, against proponents of 
common law rules and common law methods.  
The conflict concluded at the end of the 19th century—
unresolved—with the deaths of proponents and opponents alike. 
Inertia, and not conscious decision, determined America’s present 
legal methods. Throughout the century, while proponents and 
opponents debated the issues, legislatures churned out statutes and 
judges produced precedents. The bar remained unmoved in 
opposition to codes and unshaken in devotion to lawyer-controlled 
common law methods. The newly-established law schools chose to 
teach precedents and case law methods rather than to develop 
codes and statutory methods. By century’s end, proponents of 
codes had passed away, but legislative mills ground on and judges 
kept deciding as they always had. Since 1900, the United States 
has had uncodified statutory law combined with common law 
methods: a remarkable and costly mismatch.9 
Scalia and Garner try to end this mismatch; they try to resurrect 
interpretive methods last addressed, they say, a century ago.10 
They identify and try to kill the cause of American stagnation: 
common law methods. Having cleared out the clutter of common 
law methods, they propose textualism to move the United States 
forward.  
Reading Law presents one possible solution to the proliferation 
of statutes. What makes it potentially a great event in American 
legal culture is its attack on common law. Not since David Dudley 
Field, Jr. has anyone of such stature in the American legal 
community sought to push aside common law methods to deal with 
statutes. Part II of this essay shows the attack of Scalia and Garner 
 9.  See James R. Maxeiner, Costs of No Codes, 31 MISS. COLLEGE L. REV. 
363 (2013). 
 10.  SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at 9 (“We believe that 
our effort is the first modern attempt, certainly in a century, [citing to Henry 
Campbell Black, Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation of the Laws 
(2d ed. 1911)] to collect and arrange only the valid canons (perhaps a third of 
the possible candidates) and to show how and why they apply to proper legal 
interpretation.”).  
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on common law; Part III summarizes their textualism proposal for 
those not already familiar with it. 
Lawyers in the United States typically identify a world of 
statutes with the Continental or civil law (e.g., French, German, 
Japanese). Part IV of this essay asks whether Scalia and Garner 
have created a civil law for the Age of Statutes. Part V shows how 
civil law systems combine textual and non-textual methods. Part 
VI shows how common law procedure is a barrier to such a 
combination.  
II. SCALIA & GARNER: COMMON LAW-TRADITION IS THE PROBLEM 
Scalia and Garner rest Reading Law on recognition that in 
today’s America the law consists of statutes.11 America of the 21st 
century is not England of the 19th century, where, in their view, 
statutes were infrequent, the law was principally judge-made, and 
judges took liberties with statutes that intruded on the common law 
in order to put through their personal ideas of public policy. In 
America of the 21st century we do not welcome such judicial 
intrusions. “Such distortion of texts adopted by the people’s 
 11.  Cf. ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The 
Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, 
in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 13 (Amy 
Gutmann ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1997) (“We live in an age of legislation, 
and most new law is statutory law. . . . The lion’s share of the norms and rules 
that actually govern… the country [come] out of Congress and the legislatures.”) 
[hereinafter Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System]; Antonin 
Scalia, Review of Steven D. Smith’s Law’s Quandary, 55 CATH. U.L. REV. 687, 
689 (2006) [hereinafter Scalia, Review of Law’s Quandary]:  
As interesting as Smith's analysis is, it essentially addresses a legal 
system that is now barely extant, the system that Holmes wrote about: 
the common law. That was a system in which there was little 
legislation, and in which judges created the law of crimes, of torts, of 
agency, of contracts, of property, of family and inheritance. And just as 
theories such as the Divine Right of Kings were necessary to justify the 
power of monarchs to make law through edicts, some theory was 
necessary to justify the power of judges (as agents of the King) to make 
law through common-law adjudication. That theory was the ‘brooding 
omnipresence’ of an unwritten law that the judges merely ‘discovered.’ 
. . . [I]t is a rare case [today] that does not involve interpretation of an 
enacted text.  
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elected representatives is,” Scalia and Garner say, 
“undemocratic.”12 
Yet some American judges refuse to abandon “the ancient 
judicial prerogative of making the law.” They prefer to 
“improvis[e] on the text to produce what they deem socially 
desirable results. . . . [In their lawmaking these] judges are also 
prodded by interpretative theorists. These are the legal realists, 
who have “convinced everyone that judges do indeed make law” 
and do not simply apply it.”13 
Scalia and Garner reject the claim of these “interpretative 
theorists” that courts are “better able to discern and articulate basic 
national ideals than are the people’s politically responsible 
representatives.”14 The result, they see, of judges straying from 
their function of applying law—when judges “overreach” and 
“fashion law” rather than fairly derive it from governing texts—is 
that they make law uncertain, create inequality of application, 
undermine democracy, and politicize themselves and their offices.  
Scalia and Garner are bold to take on the common law 
tradition; they did not have to. They could have attributed the 
problems they discuss to “the desire for freedom from the text, 
which enables judges to do what they want.”15 Instead of timidity, 
they show courage. They target as principal culprit the common 
law mindset that the nation’s law professors teach. Perhaps they 
 12.  SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at 3. See also Scalia, 
Review of Law’s Quandary, supra note 11, at 687-689 (“[A democracy is] quite 
incompatible with the making (or the ‘finding’) of law by judges . . .”). 
 13.  SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at 4-5.  
 14.  Id. at 4 (quoting THOMAS C. GREY, DO WE HAVE AN UNWRITTEN 
CONSTITUTION, STANFORD LEGAL ESSAYS 179, 182 (1975)). The present poor 
perception of Congress tends to support the conclusions of the theorists, at least 
in practice, if not in theory. For current criticisms see, e.g., Symposium: The 
Most Disparaged Branch: The Role of Congress in the Twenty-First Century, 89 
BOSTON U.L. REV. 331-870 (2009); LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC LOST: HOW 
MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT (Twelve 2011); 
THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW 
CONGRESS IS FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK (Oxford 
Univ. Press 2006). 
 15.  SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at 9.  
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perceive that without disarming the common law tradition, their 
proposal will suffer the same fate as the few codes that were 
adopted in the United States in the 19th century: death by judicial 
interpretation.16  
Scalia and Garner do not nip at the edges of the common law; 
they attack it head on and try to root out its most important 
manifestations. So even before they get to the canons of 
construction, they lob a nuclear artillery shell on the whole idea:  
American legal education has long been devoted to the 
training of common-law lawyers, and hence common-law 
judges. What aspiring lawyers learn in the first, formative 
year of law school is how to discern the best (most socially 
useful) answer to a legal problem, and how to distinguish 
the prior cases that stand in the way of that solution. 
Besides giving students the wrong impression about what 
makes an excellent judge in a modern, democratic, text-
based legal system, this training fails to inculcate the skills 
of textual interpretation.17 
Can this be most conservatives’ favorite judge speaking? Is he 
ready to toss into the dustbin of history common law thinking? 
Yes, he is. Elsewhere, Scalia affirms that he objects to the common 
law “mind-set that asks, ‘What is the most desirable resolution of 
this case, and how can any impediments to the achievement of that 
result be evaded?’”18  
In an earlier essay Scalia colorfully explains how the American 
image of the great judge works against good judging in a modern 
state. So he writes: 
 [T]his system of making law by judicial opinion . . . is 
what every American law student, every newborn 
American lawyer, first sees when he opens his eyes. And 
 16.  See Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, supra note 11, 
at 11 (“The nineteenth-century codification movement espoused by Rantoul and 
Field was generally opposed by the bar, and hence did not achieve substantial 
success, except in one field: civil procedure, the law governing the trial of civil 
cases.”). 
 17.  SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at 7. 
 18.  Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, supra note 11, at 
13. 
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the impression remains for life. His image of the great 
judge—the Holmes, the Cardozo—is the man (or woman) 
who has the intelligence to discern the best rule of law for 
the case at hand and then the skill to perform the broken-
field running through earlier cases that leaves him free to 
impose that rule: distinguishing one prior case on the left, 
straight-arming another on the right, high-stepping away 
from another precedent about to tackle him from the rear, 
until (bravo!) he reaches the goal—good law. That image 
of the great judge remains with the former law student 
when he himself becomes a judge, and thus the common-
law tradition is passed on.19 
This is not the image of a modest judge who applies statutes to 
facts.20  
In a nutshell, Scalia and Garner object to the common law ideal 
that judges should mold the law to fit the facts, rather than take the 
law as a legislative given and apply it.21 To undercut that ethos, 
they challenge specific common law traditions in treating statutes. 
Canons of strict construction of statutes. Scalia and Garner 
take on the old common law prejudices against statutes 
incorporated in the traditional canons that they mostly seek to 
resuscitate. They expose the false “notion that words should be 
strictly construed.” Instead, citing Justice Story, they identify that 
what is needed is “reasonableness, not strictness, of 
interpretation.”22 They reject, as “a relic of the courts’ historical 
hostility to the emergence of statutory law,” the old canon that 
statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly 
construed. Instead, they say, “The better view is that statutes will 
not be interpreted as changing the common law unless they effect 
the change with clarity.”23  
 19.  Id. at 9. 
 20.  See James R. Maxeiner, Imagining Judges that Apply the Law: How 
They Might Do It, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 469 (2009). 
 21.  See generally Richard B. Cappalli, At the Point of Decision, The 
Common Law’s Advantage over the Civil Law, 12 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L. J. 87 
(1998). 
 22.  SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at 355. 
 23.  Id. at 318. Story, too, felt the need to moderate rather than terminate the 
canon. See ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA, supra note 7, at 584 (“In all cases of a 
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Statutory stare decisis. Scalia and Garner boldly challenge, as 
inconsistent with textualism, the essential doctrine of the common 
law, stare decisis, i.e., that common law courts follow their past 
decisions and that inferior courts are bound to follow decisions of 
superior courts. In the course of the 19th century, American courts 
began to apply stare decisis, not only to decisions based on the 
common law, but to decisions construing statutes (“statutory stare 
decisis” or “statutory precedent”). Some appellate courts take that 
principle further in order to use interpretation of statutes as 
opportunity to make law; they create legal uncertainty that Scalia 
and Garner decry. Lower courts, in following statutory precedents, 
turn their attention away from the text that they are to apply, to the 
appellate court’s interpretation of the text; they devalue the statute 
itself.24 
Scalia and Garner reject statutory stare decisis. The text 
controls. Thus, they say, “good judges dealing with statutes do not 
make law. Judges deciding cases do not ‘give new content’ to the 
statute, but merely apply the content that has been there all along, 
awaiting application to myriad factual scenarios.”25 What they do 
is considerably more modest than making law: “a court’s 
application of a statute to a ‘new situation’ can be said to establish 
the law applicable to that situation—that is, to pronounce 
definitely whether and how the statute applies to that situation. But 
establishing this retail application is [not] ‘creating law,’ 
‘adapt[ing] legal doctrines,’ and ‘giv[ing] them new content.’”26  
doubtful nature, the common law will prevail, and the statute not be construed to 
repeal it.”). 
 24.  On statutory stare decisis, see Peter L. Strauss, The Common Law and 
Statutes, 70 COLO. L. REV. 225, 231, 244-245 (1999); James R. Maxeiner, 
Thinking Like a Lawyer Abroad: Putting Justice into Legal Reasoning, 11 
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 55, 82-83 (2012) [hereinafter Maxeiner, 
Thinking Like a Lawyer Abroad]. 
 25.  SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at 5. [Emphasis in 
original, quotation and citations omitted]. 
 26.  Id. 
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As much as Scalia and Garner would like to throw out statutory 
stare decisis altogether, they cannot quite bring themselves to do 
so. They end their book condemning it, yet acknowledging 
dependence on it: 
Stare decisis . . . is not a part of textualism. It is an 
exception to textualism (as it is to any theory of 
interpretation) born not of logic but of necessity. Courts 
cannot consider anew every previously decided question 
that comes before them. Stare decisis has been a part of our 
law from time immemorial,27 and we must bow to it. All 
we categorically propose here is that, when a governing 
precedent deserving of stare decisis effect does not dictate 
a contrary disposition, judges ought to use proper methods 
of textual interpretation. If they will do that, then over time 
the law will be more certain, and the rule of law will be 
more secure.28  
If truth be told, here Scalia and Garner are bowing to a 
different necessity than convenience.29 It is a necessity of political 
acceptance: their originalism-based proposals will be dead on 
arrival if they are seen “to turn the clock back” to produce a 
“‘radical purge’ of society’s settled practices and beliefs.”30  
 
 27.  The Supreme Court itself sometimes puts aside Holmes’ aphorism and 
decides, because, that’s the way we always have done it. See, e.g., Flood v. 
Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (baseball exemption from antitrust law); Burnham v. 
Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (tag rule of civil procedure); Calero-Toledo 
v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974) (civil forfeiture of innocent 
owner’s yacht).  
 28.  SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at 413-414. 
 29.  Civil law systems get along fine interpreting statutes without binding 
precedents. 
 30.  SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at 411. Accord, id. at 
87:  
A frequent line of attack against originalism consists in appeal to 
popular Supreme Court decisions that are asserted based on a rejection 
of original meaning. We do not propose overruling all those decisions. 
Our prescriptions are for the future. For the past, we believe in the 
doctrine of stare decisis, which will preserve most of the nonoriginalist 
holdings on the books. Which ones will fall depends on several factors. 
[FN 38. See infra at 411-14] Stare decisis is beyond the scope of our 
discussion here, but it is germane to the present point that the relevant 
factors include the degree of public acceptance.  
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III. SCALIA & GARNER: [PURE] TEXTUALISM IS THE SOLUTION 
Scalia and Garner propose textualism as the solution to the 
problem of controlling judges who take liberties with texts. It is to 
be the generally agreed on approach to the interpretation of legal 
texts. Textualism will save Americans from politicized judges who 
impair the predictability of judicial decisions, give unequal 
treatment to similarly situated litigants, weaken our democratic 
process and distort our governmental system of checks and 
balances. It is not too late to restore a strong sense of judicial 
fidelity to texts.31 
Textualism, Scalia and Garner say, is not a novel approach, but 
“the oldest and most commonsensical interpretative principle.”32 
They define textualism to be “the doctrine that the words of a 
governing text are of paramount concern, and what they convey in 
their context is what the text means.”33  
Scalia and Garner assert that if one is not a textualist, one must 
be a “non-textualist.” Non-textualists come in a variety of species, 
the two most common of which are purposivists and pragmatists 
(also called “consequentialists” by Scalia and Garner). Both 
purposivism and pragmatism “liberate” judges from the constraints 
of rules. Purposivism gives interpreters the opportunity to change 
texts according to what they perceive to be the purposes of statutes. 
Scalia and Garner pigeon-hole purposivism as a license to 
manipulate. It produces uncertainty. Pragmatism allows 
interpreters to give texts “sensible, desirable results.” The problem: 
“people differ over what is sensible and what is desirable.” 
According to Scalia and Garner, the people have given those 
decisions to elected representatives.34 
Scalia and Garner are concerned with controlling judges; they 
do not dwell on obvious benefits that textualism has for guiding 
 31.  SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at xxvii. 
 32.  Id. at 15. 
 33.  Id. at 441. 
 34.  Id. at 22. 
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society generally. Most applications of law are self-applications. 
Subjects consider what they know of the law and fit themselves 
within it. If law is easily manipulated, or simply uncertain, those 
who skirt the law have an invitation to do so: So sue me! Those 
who scrupulously follow the law are dissuaded from taking action 
they might otherwise take: It’s too risky!35 
The principal elements of textualism in its basic form are: 
The words of the statute are paramount. A textualist extracts 
the meaning of the text from the words of the text itself and 
nothing more.36  
The statute is to be given a fair reading, neither strict, nor 
liberal. A fair reading is: “The interpretation that would be given 
to a text by a reasonable reader, fully competent in the language, 
who seeks to understand what the text meant at its adoption, and 
who considers the purpose of the text but derives purpose from the 
words actually used.”37  
The statute is to be understood objectively. The interpreter is to 
look to the words expressed in the text and not to the unexpressed 
thoughts of legislators. Collective bodies have no intent.38 
If the plain meaning of a statute is clear, it should be followed, 
unless absurd. An unambiguous text is to be applied by its terms 
without recourse to policy, historical arguments or other matter 
extraneous to the text. The legislature has stated what the law is; it 
is not for law-appliers to overrule those decisions.  
Where more than one interpretation is possible, only 
permissible meanings are to be considered. Words and sentences 
are not to be given meanings that they will not bear.39 
 35.  See generally James R. Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in 
America: U.S. Legal Methods and the Rule of Law, 41 VALPARAISO L. REV. 517 
(2006). 
 36.  SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at 441. 
 37.  Id. at 428. Basic textualism does not seem to require, however, as pure 
textualism does, that the meaning be fixed as that at the time of adoption. 
 38.  Id. at 391. 
 39.  Id. at 31. 
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Where more than one interpretation is permissible, principles 
of interpretation, many called “canons of construction”, guide 
decision-makers.40 These principles are not absolute; instead, they 
interrelate.41  
It is at this point, when the meaning of the text is ambiguous,42 
that pure textualism diverges from basic textualism. In basic 
textualism, the interpreter might resort to any number of 
interpretative tools. In pure textualism, according to Scalia and 
Garner, interpretation “begins and ends with what the text says and 
fairly implies.”43 It limits interpretation to principles based on 
language and historical meaning (but not legislative history). 
Scalia and Garner allow some systemic arguments. But they 
exclude other interpretive arguments, including purposive, 
pragmatic, and most equitable arguments.  
Principal additional characteristics of pure textualism are: 
Words must be given the meaning they had when the text was 
adopted.44 This is Scalia and Garner’s preferred meaning of 
originalism.45 
 40.  Id. at 32. 
 41.  Id. at 59. This rejects the approach many common lawyers would like 
to see, i.e., that canons of construction are like rules that are binding. 
Presumably there would be a mandatory and therefore predictable construction, 
which would facilitate presenting cases in court. See generally, Sydney Foster, 
Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation 
Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863 (2008); Abbe R. Gluck, The States as 
Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation, Methodological Consensus and the 
New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750 (2010); Abbe R. Gluck, 
Statutory Interpretation Methodology as “Law”: Oregon’s Path-Breaking 
Interpretive Framework and Its Lessons for the Nation, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 
539 (2011); Gary O’Connor, Restatement (First) of Statutory Interpretation, 7 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 333 (2003); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, 
Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085 (2002). It is, 
however, consistent with Supreme Court precedent. See Conn. Nat'l Bank v. 
Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992) (“no more than rules of thumb that help 
courts determine the meaning of legislation”); Chickasaw Nation v. United 
States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001) (canons of construction are not “mandatory rules” 
but rather are “guides that need not be conclusive”). 
 42.  Note that here Scalia and Garner are dealing with ambiguity in the 
language of the text, and not ambiguity in how the text applies to a particular 
case. 
 43.  SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at 16. 
 44.  SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at 78. 
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Legislative history is not an acceptable argument in statutory 
interpretation. Legislative bodies are collectives. Who is to say 
that all of the legislators had the same understanding?  
Doing justice is not an acceptable basis for statutory 
interpretation. Judges must be faithful to the law.46 Scalia and 
Garner follow Blackstone: “law, without equity, though hard and 
disagreeable, is much more desirable for the public good, than 
equity without law.”47 
The meaning of a statute is not to be found in the social, 
political or economic objectives of the law.48   
Judges are not to supply law for omitted cases. Legislation is 
for the legislature. For judges to correct the statute violates 
principles of separation of powers.49 
This is the prescription of Scalia and Garner of a modern law 
for the Age of Statutes.  
 
 
 45.  Id. at 435. 
 46.  Id. at 347. Id. at 348: 
The problem is that although properly informed human minds may 
agree on what a text means, human hearts often disagree on what is 
right. That is why we vote (directly or through our representatives) on 
what the law ought to be, but leave it to experts of interpretation called 
judges to decide what an enacted law means. It is doubtless true, as a 
descriptive matter, that judges will often strain to avoid what they 
consider an unjust result. But we decline to elevate that human 
tendency to an approved principle of interpretation. 
The soundest, most defensible position is one that requires discipline 
and self-abnegation. If judges think no further ahead than achieving 
justice in the dispute now at hand, the law becomes subject to personal 
preferences and hence shrouded in doubt. It is age-old wisdom among 
mature, experienced legal thinkers that procedure matters most: how 
things should be done, as opposed to what should be done. And for 
judges the ‘how’ is fidelity to law. But it is a hard lesson to learn, and 
harder to follow. 
 47.  SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at v (unnumbered in 
book). 
 48.  Id. at 438. 
 49.  Id. at 349-350. 
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IV. IS TEXTUALISM A CIVIL LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES? 
Is textualism a civil law for the Age of Statues? Scalia and 
Garner invite us to ask that question when they claim the mantel of 
consistency with “the best legal thinkers” and when they invoke 
Bentham and Continentals such as Gadamer, Kelsen, Locke, 
Montesquieu and Thibaut. The title of an earlier essay by Scalia 
practically begs us to ask it: Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law 
System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting 
the Constitution and Laws.50 Is Scalia, who is better known for 
opposing references to foreign law than promoting them, creating 
his own civil law? In Reading Law, he and Garner peripherally pay 
tribute to civil law methods when they quote Karl Llewellyn (albeit 
in a footnote): “It is indeed both sobering and saddening to match 
our boisterous ways with a statutory text against the watchmaker’s 
delicacy and care of a . . . Continental legal craftsman.”51  
Textualism shares much with civil law approaches. Its basic 
model is mainstream the world over. It has been used, as Scalia 
and Garner say, for centuries. In textualism, the written law 
governs. Pure textualism, however, has more in common with past 
manifestations of civil law methods than with modern ones. In 
Germany, for example, its closest cousin is the Prussian Code of 
1794, and not any later code. 
This observation is not condemnation, but constructive 
criticism. Scalia and Garner are making up for a deficit of two 
centuries in dealing with statutes. While Americans have made 
little progress with written law since the path-breaking 
Constitution,52 civil law countries have made much.53 Scalia and 
 50.  In SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 11, at 3-47.  
 51.  SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at 8, n.16 citing to 
KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 380 
(1960). 
 52.  Cf. Charles Abernathy, The Lost European Aspirations of US 
Constitutional Law, in 24. FEBRUAR 1803, DIE ERFINDUNG DER 
VERFASSUNGSGERICHTSBARKEIT UND IHRE FOLGEN 37 (Werner Kremp, ed. 
2003):  
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Garner have released, what we might call, U.S. Textualism 
Version 1.0.  
Here in Part IV we consider what basic textualism shares with 
civil law methods, and second, what sets pure textualism apart 
from contemporary civil law methods. For practical reasons, we 
limit our consideration to one of the world’s two leading civil law 
jurisdictions, that of Germany, and mention only incidentally that 
of the other, France.54 
A. Textualism is Civil 
Basic textualism as stated by Scalia and Garner is consistent 
with German approaches to statutes. In Germany, statutes are the 
Despite its European origins, [the U.S.] legal constitutional tree has 
grown into a very strange hybrid, a tree with continental European 
roots but an increasingly common-law superstructure of branches, 
trunks, and leaves. Despite repeated attempts by some Supreme Court 
justices, the continental code-law tradition has been unable to win a 
majority at the Supreme Court for many decades. 
 53.  See, e.g., Reinhard Zimmermann, Statute Sunt Stricte Interpretanda? 
Statutes and the Common Law: A Continental Perspective, 56 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 
315, 315-316 (1997) [hereinafter Zimmermann, Statutes] (“An English 
colleague has suggested that ‘civilian lawyers regard our case law with 
admiration and our statute book with despair.’ It may therefore be appropriate to 
remind ourselves that civilian lawyers once struggled with the same kind of 
problem that is being addressed today.”); id. at 321 (in Germany, following 
adoption of the 1949 constitution, in statutory interpretation there has been “a 
considerable advance in legal culture.”). 
 54.  For the convenience of readers who may not read German and yet wish 
to follow the argument further, I largely cite English-language works by leading 
German scholars. In particular, I cite the one standard work on German legal 
methods which has been translated into English: REINHOLD ZIPPELIUS, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LEGAL METHODS (Kirk W. Junker & P. Matthew 
Roy trans., 10th ed., Carolina Acad. Press 2008) [hereinafter ZIPPELIUS]. The 
first edition appeared under the title EINFÜHRUNG IN DIE JURISTISCHE 
METHODENLEHRE (1st ed. 1971); the most recent is under the title 
JURISTISTISCHE METHODENLEHRE: EINE EINFÜHRUNG (10th ed. 2006). The other 
classic students’ text is KARL ENGISCH, EINFÜHRUNG IN DAS JURISTISCHE 
DENKEN (1st ed. 1956; 10th ed., Thomas Würtenberger & Dirk Otto eds., 2005). 
The classic academic text is KARL LARENZ, METHODENLEHRE DER 
RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT (1st ed. 1960; 6th ed. 1991; 4th condensed study ed. with 
Claus-Wilhelm Canaris, 2009). The global comparative work is WOLFGANG 
FIKENTSCHER, METHODEN DES RECHTS IN VERGLEICHENDER DARSTELLUNG (5 
vols., Mohr 1975–1977). 
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principal form of law. If their application is clear, they must be 
followed, unless they are invalid (e.g., unconstitutional). 
Democracy and the rule of law demand no less.55 
The words of the text are paramount. In Germany, the words of 
the text are of paramount concern; they convey what the text 
means. The statute—das Gesetz—is the fundamental concept of all 
law. When an American says, “we have a rule of law, not of men,” 
a German says, “statutes, not men, govern.”56  
Statutes must be followed unless the result is irrational or 
unjust.57 No one—other than the Constitutional Court—is 
permitted to put a valid law out-of-force. To allow a judge, a 
government official or a subject of the law not to apply the law is 
to deny that Germany is a democratic, rule-of-law state. 
Statutes are interpreted objectively. Statutes should be 
understood objectively, that is, according to “the intention of the 
statute itself.”58 An objective interpretation seeks an understanding 
“familiar to the mindset of a wide number of people.”59 There is no 
attempt to recreate a subjective intent of those who took part in the 
legislative process.60 Their individual wills are difficult to 
determine and are unlikely to be in harmony with one another.61 
Words have a range of meanings. Statutes and other legal rules 
put ideas into words. Words are, however, ambiguous; they may 
refer to more than one concept. Words that describe facts seldom 
 55.  Winfried Brugger, Concretization of Law and Statutory Interpretation, 
11 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 207, 208 (1996) [hereinafter Brugger, Concretization 
of Law]. 
 56.  WALTER LEISNER, KRISE DES GESETZES: DIE AUFLÖSUNG DES 
NORMENSTAATES 5 (Duncker und Humblot 2001) (“Nicht Menschen 
herrschen—Gesetze gelten.”). See also James R. Maxeiner, Legal Certainty: A 
European Alternative to American Legal Indeterminacy?, 15 TULANE J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 541, 558 (2007) [hereinafter Maxeiner, Legal Certainty]. 
 57.  Winfried Brugger, Legal Interpretation, Schools of Jurisprudence, and 
Anthropology: Some Remarks from a German Point of View, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. 
395, 401 (1994) [hereinafter Brugger, Legal Interpretation]. See also Brugger, 
Concretization of Law, supra note 55.  
 58.  ZIPPELIUS, supra note 54, at 30. 
 59.  Id. at 32. 
 60.  Id. at 32. 
 61.  Id. at 33. 
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carry the same meaning for everyone. A given word has a “range 
of meanings.”62 To go outside the range of possible meanings 
creates a legitimacy problem;63 it is to take over the function 
reserved to the legislature.64  
Where there is more than one meaning within a range, 
principles of interpretation guide interpretation. Where the 
principles of the common law, the canons, are numerous and 
particular, the principles of German law are few and general. Four 
approaches are dominant:65 (1) grammatical, (2) historical, (3) 
systemic, and (4) purposive (teleological).66 The classical criteria 
of interpretation, while they facilitate finding the correct 
interpretation, do not give license to go outside the range of 
possible meanings of a statute’s words. “All further efforts at 
interpretation proceed on the basis of a word’s possible meaning. 
These efforts are carried out within a range of meaning that is 
permissible according to linguistic usage (possibly circumscribed 
by legal definitions).”67 Every approach must, however, “respect 
the outer bounds of grammatical analysis.”68 
 62.  Id. at 62-66. 
 63.  Id. at 96. 
 64. Id. at 72. 
 65.  Zimmermann, Statutes, supra note 53, at 320. 
 66.  Id. at 60. See also id. at 320 (“ (1) the literal meaning of the words or 
the grammatical structure of a sentence, (2) the legislative history, (3) the 
systematic context and (4) the design, or purpose, of a legal rule.” [citing 1 
FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN RÖMISCHEN RECHTS 
206 (1840) (translated as SYSTEM OF THE ROMAN LAW (William Holloway 
trans., 1979) (1867)]); Brugger, Concretization of Law, supra note 55, at 234 
(listing in table form what four methods more fully described in the article, i.e., 
“I. textual interpretation ‘what is specifically said’; II. Contextual interpretation 
‘what is said in context’; III. Historical interpretation ‘what was willed’; IV. 
Teleological interpretation ‘what is the purpose’”); Robert Alexy & Ralf Dreier, 
Statutory Interpretation in Germany, in INTERPRETING STATUTES: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY 73, 82-89 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers 
eds., Ashgate 1991) (giving a somewhat different breakdown of approaches).  
 67.  ZIPPELIUS, supra note 54, at 60; (“feasible meanings” at 67).  
 68.  Brugger, Legal Interpretation, supra note 57, at 400; See also Brugger, 
Concretization of Law, supra note 55.  
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Of these four approaches, the most common is the purposive, 
which includes an equitable approach.69 
Variations and additions are sometimes suggested, particularly 
since the adoption of the Basic Law in 1949 (with respect to 
fundamental rights and the structure of the state), and the accession 
in 1958 to what is now the European Union (particularly with 
respect to harmonization of law). Whether constitutional texts 
should receive different treatment is debated, with no clear 
resolution. 
Which interpretation prevails is argumentative. There is no 
hierarchy in applying the approaches. An interpreter may make use 
of all approaches and choose the approach or approaches that seem 
most convincing in a particular case.70 It is said that “the decisive 
point of reference is the interpreter’s notion of a result that, 
according to the ‘independent function’ or value of the pertinent 
legal provision, must be the correct one.”71  
B. Pure Textualism is Uncivil 
Pure textualism was the approach of the Prussian Civil Code of 
1794. Its section 46 of the Introductory Part prohibited judges from 
going beyond the text. If the judge could not get the meaning from 
the text, he was to refer the legal question to a special code 
commission.72 The approach was regarded as monstrous.  
Pure textualism in Germany today would be anathema. 
Zimmermann writes that “[o]n the Continent we have managed to 
 69.  Zimmermann, Statutes, supra note 53, at 320; Reinhard Zimmermann, 
Characteristic Aspects of German Legal Culture, in INTRODUCTION OF GERMAN 
LAW 1, 24-25 (J. Zekoll & M. Reimann eds., 2d ed., Wolters Kluwer 2005). 
 70.  Brugger, Legal Interpretation, supra note 57, at 402.  
 71.  Id. at 397. 
 72.  “Bey Entscheidungen streitiger Rechtsfälle darf der Richter den 
Gesetzen keinen andern Sinn beylegen, als welcher aus den Worten, und den 
Zusammenhänge derselben, in Beziehung auf den streitigen Gegenstand, oder 
aus den nächsten unzweifelhaften Gründe des Gesetzes, deutlich erhellt.” 
ALLGEMEINES LANDRECHT FÜR DIE PREUßISCHEN STAATEN VON 1794, 
TEXTAUSGABE MIT EINER EINFÜHRUNG VON HANS HATTEHAUER 58 (2d ed., 
Luchterhand 1994).  
 
 
                                                                                                             
2013] SCALIA & GARNER’S READING LAW 21 
 
shake off the self-imposed fetters of a literalist approach to 
statutory interpretation.”73 In Germany, the most practiced method 
is said to be purposivism:74 i.e., poison to Scalia and Garner. Their 
panacea, the historical, it is said in Germany, “generally serves 
only as a secondary, supplementary way of clarifying a rule’s 
meaning.”75 
Some basic principles of modern German interpretation are 
opposed to Scalia and Garner’s pure textualism. For example: 
Statutes should be interpreted according to ideas of the present 
(“living interpretation”). They are not to be limited ideas 
controlling at the time they were adopted.76 “The basis of 
legitimacy of law to be applied today does not lie in the past; it lies 
in the present. . . . For the present it does not matter under whose 
authority the statute was enacted, but rather under whose authority 
it lives on today.”77 
Certain legislative history is an acceptable argument in 
statutory interpretation. German legislative procedures differ from 
American. Most statutes are presented to the legislature in draft 
form for debate. The debates themselves are not tools of 
interpretation, but one may rely on the formal justifications 
provided with the draft statutes to understanding the meaning of 
the words used in the drafts. 
 73.  Zimmermann, Statutes, supra note 53, at 320. 
 74.  Id. at 320. 
 75.  Brugger, Legal Interpretation, supra note 57, at 401. 
 76.  ZIPPELIUS, supra note 54, at 34. 
 77.  Id. at 34-35. While considerations of legitimacy and of justice demand 
a living interpretation, Zippelius teaches that considerations of separation of 
powers (and we might add, of legal certainty), require that “a change in meaning 
must not only keep itself within the possible meanings of the text of a legal 
norm, but also, where possible, within that very range of meaning that the 
purpose of the legislation leaves open for honing in on.” Id. at 36. German 
ministries of justice are responsible for removing from the statute books 
obsolete laws. Some newer German laws as adopted automatically expire. See 
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, BETTER 
REGULATION IN EUROPE: GERMANY, 114-15 (2010), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/document/63/0,3746,en_2649_34141_45048895_1_1_1_1,
00.html (last visited 04/23/13). 
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Doing justice is an acceptable basis for statutory 
interpretation. The judge asks: “Which of the possible ‘justifiable’ 
interpretations, according to the rules of the art, lead to the most 
just solution?”78 
The meaning of a statute may be found in the social, political 
or economic objectives of the law. 
Judges may—exceptionally—supply law for omitted cases.79 In 
filling in gaps, it is appropriate to consider societal goals, system 
consistency and justice.80 Gap-filling to achieve material justice 
raises the question as to whether supplementation should be done 
politically, for the future by the legislature, or according to existing 
law, by judges.81 
The German system poses a challenge to Scalia and Garner: it 
practices textualism, but rejects its pure form and takes the poison 
of purposivism. It seeks to do justice in individual cases or to 
provide pragmatic solutions. One would expect that Germany 
would be a cesspool of renegade judges imposing their individual 
ideas of justice; yet the German system is not. To the contrary, it is 
known for separating policy and law, and stressing legal certainty. 
How are we to explain this enigma? That is the topic of Part V. 
 
 
 
 
 78.  ZIPPELIUS, supra note 54 at 86. 
 79.  Id. at 17. 
 80.  Id. at 97. 
 81.  Id. at 91: 
By supplementing the law, the judge is functioning in a manner 
reserved for the legislature under a system of separation of powers. The 
legislature is in a better position than a court to tackle questions of legal 
supplementation—considerations that are often highly political in 
nature—and it does so with more democratic legitimacy, particularly 
with respect to the necessary debate and conversation with the public. 
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V. IN MODERN CIVIL LAW TEXTUALISM AND NON-TEXTUALISM 
COEXIST 
Textualism and non-textualism coexist in modern civil law 
systems. They must, if law is to do its job and balance justice, 
policy and legal certainty.82  
A. Law in Time Requires that Textualism and Non-Textualism Must 
Coexist 
Legislatures enact rules that apply generally today and into the 
future. The limits of our ability to know the present, and to foresee 
the future, limit the ability of legislatures to prescribe legal 
answers to future questions.83 Often rules set outer limits of their 
application without prescribing exact decisions. They leave precise 
decisions to those who apply the law. They may provide criteria or 
procedures for decisions. 
Textualism defines the outer limits of decisions. Non-
textualism determines how those rules are applied within the limits 
set. The outer limits provide one level of legal certainty to those 
subject to the law;84 confidence in how those applying the law will 
do so within those outer limits can add a second level of legal 
certainty. The laws, written by the legislature, provide general 
rules intended to achieve justice and policy goals. Those charged 
with applying the law, within its limits, are responsible for 
reaching decisions that not only comply with the letter of the law, 
but that also fulfill the goal of law to achieve justice and good 
policy.  
 82.  Cf. JAMES R. MAXEINER, POLICY AND METHODS IN GERMAN AND 
AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 12 (Praeger 1986) 
[hereinafter MAXEINER, POLICY AND METHODS IN GERMAN AND AMERICAN 
ANTITRUST LAW]; Brugger, Concretization of Law, supra note 55, at 209-217. 
 83.  See James R. Maxeiner, Legal Certainty, supra note 56, at 554-55; 
Brugger, Concretization of Law, supra note 55, at 224-30. 
 84.  One might say that the law binds negatively. See MAXEINER, POLICY 
AND METHODS IN GERMAN AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 82. 
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As we have seen, the drafters of the Prussian Code of 1794 
sought to tie judges strictly to texts. If the text did not deliver the 
answer, then judges were to refer questions to a legislative 
commission. The drafters of the French Codes of 1804 charted a 
better and more modern course. They sought to limit judges with 
textualism, but to guide them with what Scalia and Garner call 
non-textualism. So Portalis, the drafter of the Code Civil, wrote in 
an essay introductory to his code: “When the law is clear, it must 
be heeded; when it is unclear, the provisions must be further 
elaborated. If there is no law, then custom or equity must be 
consulted. Equity is the return to natural law when positive laws 
are silent, contradictory or vague.”85 In the modern civil law 
world, textualism and non-textualism can and must coexist. 
Portalis eloquently stated how the phenomenon of law in time 
requires that texts cannot be unchanging: 
Whatever one might do, positive laws could never entirely 
replace the use of natural reason in life’s affairs. The needs 
of society are so varied, the communication of men so 
active, their interests so numerous, and their relationships 
so far reaching, that the lawmaker cannot possibly foresee 
all. 
The very matters on which he fixes his attention involve a 
host of particulars that escape him or are too contentious 
and too volatile to be the subject of a statutory enactment. 
Moreover, how does one bind the action of time? How to 
go against the course of events, or the imperceptible 
inclination of morals? How to know and calculate in 
advance what experience alone can reveal? Can foresight 
ever extend to things beyond the reach of thought? 
A code, however complete it may seem, is no sooner 
 85.  PRELIMINARY ADDRESS ON THE FIRST DRAFT OF THE CIVIL CODE 
PRESENTED IN THE YEAR IX BY MESSRS. PORTALIS, TRONCHET, BIGOT-
PRÉAMENEU AND MALEVILLE, MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNMENT-APPOINTED 
COMMISSION (1801), translated and available at http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi 
/icg-gci/code/index.html (last visited 4/26/13); see the original French Portalis, 
Tronchet, Bigot-Préameneu & Maleville, Discourse préliminaire, in 1 J. LOCRÉ, 
LA LÉGISLATION CIVILE, COMMERCIALE ET CRIMINELLE DE LA FRANCE 251, 
255-72 (1827) ; see also ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN & JAMES RUSSELL 
GORDLEY, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 54-55 (2d ed., Little, Brown & Co. 1977) 
(translation of an extract).  
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finished than thousands of unexpected questions present 
themselves to the magistrate. For these laws, once drafted, 
remain as written. Men, on the other hand, never rest. They 
are always moving; and this movement, which never ceases 
and whose effects are variously modified by circumstances, 
continually produces some new fact, some new outcome.86 
How are Scalia and Garner and other proponents of pure 
textualism and originalism to answer this wisdom? It is simplistic 
for them to say that the legislature should amend the laws. It is 
wishful thinking and reminiscent of the failed Prussian legislative 
commission to think that we might, as some scholars have recently 
suggested, add procedures to refer disputed questions back to 
legislatures.87 
Civil law systems can read law combining textualism and non-
textualism because civil law methods of writing and applying law 
facilitate doing so. Statutes and procedures anticipate that appliers 
will be making equity and policy decisions. 
B. Reading Law is Doctrinal Rather than Authoritative 
In civil law systems, most instances of statutory interpretation 
are, in the words of Portalis which we adopt here, doctrinal and not 
authoritative.88 Doctrinal interpretation helps judges determine 
whether the facts of a particular case fall within the bounds of a 
statute. It consists of understanding the true meaning of statutes. 
The interpretation binds no future courts. Authoritative 
interpretation, on the other hand, settles issues and creates rules. It 
does bind future decisions. Authoritative interpretation ideally 
 86.  PORTALIS, supra note 85 [unpaginated]. 
 87.  See, e.g., Amanda Frost, Certifying Questions to Congress, 101 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1 (2007). 
 88.  So Portalis wrote:  
Doctrinal interpretation consists in grasping the true meaning of laws, 
in applying them judiciously and in supplementing them in cases where 
they do not apply. Can one conceive of fulfilling the office of judge 
without this type of interpretation? 
Authoritative interpretation consists in settling issues and doubts by 
means of rules or general provisions. This mode of interpretation is the 
only one denied the judge. 
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would be the exclusive prerogative of the legislature. But practical 
realities preclude that. Today, courts of last resort in Germany and 
other civil law countries issue authoritative interpretations. When 
interpretation is doctrinal, the integrity of the text is maintained no 
matter how a particular court decides in an individual case; when it 
is authoritative, courts, by becoming interpreters, become 
lawgivers.89  
Scalia and Garner, in seeking to curtail stare decisis, would 
make statutory interpretation largely doctrinal. They too see 
authoritative interpretation as lawmaking. They would limit 
authoritative interpretations. They say that applying law in a 
particular case is—at most—a “retail” making of law: “a court’s 
application of a statute to a ‘new situation’ can be said to establish 
the law applicable to that situation—that is, to pronounce 
definitively whether and how the statute applies to that situation. 
But establishing this retail application is [not] ‘creating law’. . . 
.”90 
C. Writing Law in the Age of Statutes 
Modern codes in civil law countries do not regulate 
comprehensively. Portalis again well-captures their methods: 
The function of the statute is to set down, in broad terms, 
the general maxims of the law, to establish principles rich 
in consequences, and not to deal with the particulars of the 
questions that may arise on every subject. 
 
 89.  John Chipman Grey in one of his books famously quoted Bishop 
Hoadly, not one time, but three times: “Whoever hath an absolute authority to 
interpret any written or spoken laws, it is He who is truly the Law-Giver to all 
intents and purposes, and not the person who first wrote or spoke them.” JOHN 
CHIPMAN GREY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF LAW 229, 276, 369 (Columbia 
Univ. Press 1909).  
 90.  SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at 5. In Germany, 
where interpretations of statutes are not given binding effect, Professor 
Fikentscher has proposed a limited binding effect in such applications, which he 
calls a “case norm”. See Wolfgang Fikentscher, Eine Theorie der Fallnorm als 
Grundlage von Kodex- und Fallrecht (code law and case law), 21 ZEITSCHRIFT 
FÜR RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG (ZfRV) 161 (1980). 
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It is left to the magistrate and the jurisconsult, fully alive to 
the overall spirit of laws, to guide their application.91 
In how closely they deal with particulars, codes vary from 
country to country, within each country, and even within 
themselves. Nevertheless, they have in common that they do not 
regulate every particular and that they do leave it to judges and 
lawyers to guide their application. 
Modern statutes serve two purposes: to the extent they can, 
they prescribe rights and obligations. When they cannot do that, 
they prescribe who can create or determine rights and obligations 
and how they may do so. In other words, statutes structure 
authority. 
In Germany, it is said that organization of authority is the 
“backbone” of a legal system’s rational structure.92 “The law [not 
only] . . . consists of obligations to do something or refrain from 
doing something, [it consists] as well as rules regulating the 
creation, modification and termination of behavioral norms or 
individual rights.”93 When we think of law, we think first of 
obligations, such as stopping at a red light. But its authorizations 
are no less important: e.g., a traffic officer may stop a motorist 
who the officer observes is not complying with traffic rules.  
Authorizations take over when rules cannot direct solutions. 
Legislatures cannot anticipate all eventualities; they cannot 
rationally pre-determine what all outcomes will be. What they can 
do is to structure authority and its exercise. Then they do not try to 
calibrate all choices in advance. They let government officials or 
individuals subject to law make essential choices. Usually, when 
legislatures give others leeway in deciding, they do not leave 
decision-makers free to decide without limitation. Usually they 
require specific criteria or specific procedures for those choices. 
 91.  Supra note 85 [unpaginated]. 
 92.  ZIPPELIUS, supra note 54, at 6. 
 93.  Id. at 11. 
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They authorize law-appliers to make value decisions of justice or 
policy.94 Yet in all these instances, law structures decisions 
without claiming to command particular decisions. Although law 
cannot answer definitively what should be decided, it can answer 
who should decide using which criteria, subject to which 
process.95 Among the techniques modern statutes use are indefinite 
legal terms, general clauses and grants of discretion. 
Indefinite legal concepts. Indefinite legal concepts allow for a 
range of meanings; they deliberately give law flexibility. “This 
range of meaning allows these general legal words to adapt to the 
wide and diverse range of legal problems and circumstances of life 
that the law seeks to regulate, as well as to the changing prevalent 
social-ethical views.”96 They permit a range of judgment to the law 
appliers.97 When indefinite concepts are used, there may be no 
“one meaning to be made from general persuasive reasons.” There 
thus becomes a range of “justifiable decisions,” although “some 
interpretations are more justifiable than others.”98 
General clauses. A general clause is a provision that depends 
on an indefinite legal concept as the operative provision. German 
statutes use general clauses to take into account the many sides of 
life that do not lend themselves to definition in clearly defined 
 94.  See MAXEINER, POLICY AND METHODS IN GERMAN AND AMERICAN 
ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 82. 
 95.  ZIPPELIUS, supra note 54, at xii. “The interpretation and development 
of the law are indeed capable of being rationally structured; however, they are 
not completely capable of being rationally determined.” 
 96.  Id. at 66. 
 97.  Zippelius gives as an example of room for judgment the term “forest.” 
Is a “small, free-standing, natural pine woods with approximately 50 half-grown 
trees” a forest?” Suppose the requisite element for a crime of arson is setting fire 
to a forest. Classifying this stand of trees as a forest is for Zippelius 
preeminently a question of interpreting the statute and not one of subsuming the 
facts under the statute. In so doing, that interpretation then gives “meaning for 
future cases.” In other words, the specific case “gives the impetus to weigh and 
to make precise the range of the meaning of the norm—with regard to the 
submitted facts of behavior.” (emphasis in the original) Id. at 132.  
 98.  ZIPPELIUS, supra note 54, at 135. 
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concepts. By using general clauses, legislation need not be 
fragmentary, but can be gap free.99  
General clauses do not permit judges to decide what they think 
is “fair” or in the “general welfare.”100 Instead, case groups 
develop in an almost common-law manner.101 Only where there 
are no prior decisions do judges have some freedom in reaching 
new solutions.102 Sometimes the legislature notes the development 
of these case groups and enacts them into law or introduces its own 
groups of cases.  
Discretion. Sometimes statutes deliberately do not bind 
decision-makers to one correct decision, but grant them discretion 
to reach their own decisions based on their own responsibility and 
independent choice. It is used to permit a purposeful or just 
decision in individual cases.103 Administrative authorities are 
allowed to make policy-oriented decisions upon their own 
responsibility; they may choose on the basis of current and local 
interests among several possibilities. This freedom is acceptable 
 99.  KARL ENGISCH, EINFÜHRUNG IN DAS JURISTISCHE DENKEN 124 (7th ed., 
Kohlhammer 1977). German indefinite legal concepts are best known in the 
United States through two general clauses of the German Civil Code, sections 
138 and 242, which have become parts of American law through adoption in the 
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] 
[Civil Code] Aug. 18, 1896, RGBL 195, as amended, §§ 138, 242. Section 138’s 
U.C.C. counterpart is § 2-302, which permits nonenforcement of 
“unconscionable” contracts or terms. U.C.C. § 2-302 (2004). Section 242 
requires performance of contracts in “good faith,” BGB § 242; its U.C.C. 
counterpart is § 1-304 (formerly § 1-203). U.C.C. § 1-304. For the origin of § 2-
302, see James R. Maxeiner, Standard-Terms Contracting in the Global 
Electronic Age, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 109, 116-117 (2003) [hereinafter Maxeiner, 
Standard-Terms Contracting]. 
 100.  See Franz Wieacker, Zur rechtstheoretischen Präzisierung des § 242 
BGB, in 2 AUSGEWÄHLTE SCHRIFTEN 195, 203 (Dieter Simon ed., Metzner 
1983). 
 101.  See Maxeiner, Standard-Terms Contracting, supra note 99.  
 102.  Wieacker, supra note 100, at 203. Wieacker also notes that § 242 looks 
to issues of individual justice and not to general welfare (policy). Id. at 196. 
 103.  A common view in Germany holds that discretion in choice of legal 
consequences (e.g., five or ten years’ imprisonment) is appropriate, but not in 
determination of the prerequisites for action (e.g., whether defendant committed 
the crime of arson). This distinction marks a difference between indefinite legal 
concepts and discretion: the former leaves room for judgment in the 
prerequisites of action, while the latter provides for freedom of action. 
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because administrative authorities are politically accountable. 
Administrative authorities are nonetheless obligated to exercise 
their freedom of choice in the public interest. Relaxation of 
binding to statute for judicial decisions, on the other hand, is 
preferably limited to situations, where necessary, that permit 
judges to do justice in individual cases. Judges are not politically 
accountable; they are guaranteed independence to permit them to 
do justice.  
D. Applying Law in the Age of Statutes 
German procedure supports the coexistence of textualism and 
non-textualism. Among the ways it does this are: (i) judges and 
government officials know the law (iura novit curia) and are 
responsible for applying it to facts provided by parties (da mihi 
factum, dabo tibi ius); (ii) judges and government officials must 
give reasoned explanations for their decisions; and (iii) judges of 
the intermediate level of appeal are responsible for reviewing all 
aspects of the decisions of courts of first instance, including the 
application of law to facts.  
i. Judges know the law and are responsible for applying it. In 
the first and second instance, the focus of German judges is on 
whether the facts in the case fulfill the requisite elements of any 
legal rule. They need to know which statutes might apply and to 
understand those statutes well enough to know what they require. 
The judge is constitutionally bound to decide according to both 
statute and justice. Procedurally the judge is bound to clarify cases. 
A judge, troubled that a case may lead to a decision contrary to 
justice or good policy, need not twist the law to reach a good 
decision; he or she may better understand the facts. Intermediate 
appellate courts have similar obligations.104  
 104.  See JAMES R. MAXEINER WITH ARMIN WEBER AND GYOOHO LEE, 
FAILURES OF AMERICAN CIVIL JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2011) [hereinafter MAXEINER, FAILURES OF AMERICAN 
CIVIL JUSTICE]. 
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ii. Reasoned explanations. Judges and government officials are 
required to give reasoned explanations for their findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and application of law to facts. They must deal 
in a prescribed form with all possible relevant laws and party 
assertions. Reasoned opinions are said to help make up for 
shortcomings of statutes. They enhance the quality of legal 
decisions. They provide foundations for review of decisions made. 
Just the knowledge that such a review is possible impels decision- 
makers to self-control. It requires them to base their decisions, or 
at least the justifications for their decisions, on approved reasons 
(e.g., the statutory requirements) and not on unapproved ones (e.g., 
bias and prejudice).105  
VI. COMMON LAW PROCEDURE IS A PROBLEM 
Scalia and Garner courageously confront common law 
tradition. There is to be no more judicial law making; only 
legislatures are to make law. Yet Scalia and Garner are haunted by 
common law procedure and a heritage of neglect of legislation. 
Their textualism is for litigation and not for life. It speaks to judges 
and to litigating parties and not to people. Its idea of a statute has 
more in common with the old writs of common law special 
pleading than it does with modern codes. Its idea of the role of the 
judge is that of an oracle who speaks law, not that of a workman 
who applies law. They fear a text that might give way to 
considerations of justice or policy, for then it would endanger the 
rule of law and separation of powers.  
Scalia and Garner are clear that their book is a how-to book for 
judges,106 especially appellate judges, who want to interpret law. 
 105.  Id. at 202-03, 228-29.  
 106.  If this were not clear enough from the book itself, Scalia says exactly 
this in talking about the book. Interview with PBS NewsHour, broadcast August 
9, 2012. 
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They write “our basic presumption: legislators enact; judges 
interpret.”107  
They do not address how legislators should enact laws. They 
almost overlook that courts of first instance apply law.108 They 
begin their book: “You be the judge—the appellate judge—for a 
moment.”109 Yet both writing and applying law are integral to a 
well-functioning reading of the law.  
The poor quality of American legislation is well known.110 
Although Scalia and Garner do not directly address it in Reading 
Law, Scalia has stressed the importance of good laws: garbage in, 
garbage out.111 He has berated Congress for “Fuzzy, leave-the-
details-to-be-sorted-out-by-the-courts legislation.”112 The United 
States has laws that we call codes, but they do not integrate laws 
the way true codes do.113 We use indefinite concepts and general 
clauses, and some are designed that way and do work, but many do 
 107.  SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at xxx (citations 
omitted). 
 108.  James Wilson wrote “every prudent and cautious judge . . . will 
remember, that his duty and his business is not to make the law, but to interpret 
and apply it.” [Emphasis added.] Part 2, Chapter V, Of the Constituent Parts of 
Courts—Of the Judges, in LECTURES ON LAW DELIVERED IN THE COLLEGE OF 
PHILADELPHIA, IN THE YEARS ONE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED AND NINETY, 
AND ONE THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED AND NINETY ONE, posthumously 
published in 2 THE WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON, 299, 303 
(Bird Wilson, 1804); 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 500, 502 (Robert Green 
McCloskey ed., 1967); 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, 950, 953 
(Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007). 
 109.  SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at 1. 
 110.  See, e.g., ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT, REGULATORY REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES 48 (OECD, 
1999) (“At the heart of the most severe regulatory problems in the United States 
is the [poor] quality of primary legislation.”); Mary Ann Glendon, Comment, in 
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 11, at 95 (our skills with 
legislation are “primitive.”). 
 111.  In a television interview he said: “But in this job, it’s garbage in, 
garbage out. If it’s a foolish law, you are bound by oath to produce a foolish 
result, because it’s not your job to decide what is foolish and what isn’t. It’s the 
job of the people across the street.” C-Span Interview at 1:49:34 (Oct. 8, 2009), 
http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/7716-1 (last visited 04/26/13). 
 112.  Sykes v. United States, 131 US 2267, 2288 (2011) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 113.  Maxeiner, Costs of No Codes, supra note 9, at 364-65. 
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not.114 We have discretion, but our granting and controlling of 
discretion is flawed at best.115  
If our skills with statutes are poor, our common law procedures 
may be worse in how they try to apply statutes.  
No one knows the law and no one has responsibility for 
applying it. We share the task of applying law among parties, 
judges and jurors. In the old common law system of special 
pleading, the plaintiff chose the form of action, and the parties 
together, through pleading, identified the point in issue. If an issue 
of law, the judge interpreted the writ, the statute, or the precedent. 
No trial was necessary; the legal point decided the case. If an issue 
of fact, jurors determined the decisive fact that fell under the point 
of issue. Of course, the law was too complicated for special 
pleading to work and the United States abandoned it—over 
Supreme Court objection—in the 19th century. The outward 
division of responsibilities, however, remains the same: the 
selection of law is for the parties, the interpretation of law is for the 
judges, and the findings of fact are for jurors. But the rational 
application of law is more myth than reality. Either judges take 
facts as given and decide motions for summary judgment, or they 
hand the case over to jurors, give them quick, unfathomable 
instructions on applying law, and pray that jurors do a good job. Of 
course, this procedure—besides expense—is so unpredictable that 
it is the rare case that ever ends up being decided by a jury.116  
Only exceptionally do courts give reasoned explanations for 
decisions. Jurors are not jurists and they are not thought capable of 
explaining their decisions. At best—and rarely—they may provide 
special verdicts or answer special interrogatories. More commonly, 
 114.  See, e.g., James R. Maxeiner, Standard Terms Contracting in the 
Global Electronic Age: European Alternatives, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 109 (2003). 
 115.  See KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY 
INQUIRY (LSU Press 1969); MORTIMER K. KADISH & SANFORD H. KADISH, 
DISCRETION TO DISOBEY: A STUDY OF LAWFUL DEPARTURES FROM LEGAL 
RULES (Stanford Univ. Press 1973). 
 116.  See MAXEINER, FAILURES OF AMERICAN CIVIL JUSTICE, supra note 
104; James R. Maxeiner, Thinking Like a Lawyer Abroad, supra note 24.  
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they provide unreasoned general verdicts. Americans know that 
there is better way. When judges decide alone without jurors they 
are required to explain their decisions. But bench trials and a 
judge’s reasoning are even rarer in many jurisdictions than are jury 
trials and verdicts.117  
How is an appellate court supposed to review such decisions? 
By American appellate procedure, judges must accept the 
(unstated) findings of fact of jurors. So if they find the outcome 
deficient, i.e., unjust or contrary to good public policy, they cannot 
go back—as their civil law counterparts—and reexamine how law 
and facts fit together. They are stuck with jiggering, with 
“interpreting”, the law. No wonder they produce decisions that 
Scalia and Garner find awful.118  
VII. CONCLUSION 
 It is a remarkable event that a sitting justice has called the 
common law out in no uncertain terms. With textualism, Justice 
Scalia and Mr. Garner have restored the playing field to its 1830 
condition. But pure textualism will not bring us into the present. 
 Pure textualism takes us back, not to the America of 1789, 
but to Blackstone of 1770 and a “law without equity.”119 Has 
America’s number one originalist forgotten the preamble of the 
Constitution? “We the people of the United States, in order to form 
a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, 
provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and 
secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, to 
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of 
America.”120 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  SCALIA & GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 1, at v [unnumbered 
introductory page]. 
 120.  U.S. Const. pmbl.; Scalia and Garner are not alone. According to 
America’s number one proponent of rules, “rule-based and precedent based 
decision making often require legal decision-makers to do something other than 
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 We deserve law that honors justice and policy as well as 
order. 
 We deserve modern legal methods, not 18th century 
methods of England or Prussia, but those of the modern civil law. 
The United States desperately needs modern legal methods for the 
Age of Statues. Those methods will encompass not only reading 
law, but writing law, applying law and teaching law. Justice Story 
was a master of all four. It will be a great event when the American 
legal system—perhaps led by Justice Scalia—can do all four well. 
 
the right thing . . . .” FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW 
INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 212 (Harvard Univ. Press 2009); see also 
Maxeiner, Thinking Like a Lawyer Abroad, supra note 24. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 
